Condition: Good, with shelf wear and creasing along the spine.
I rediscovered this book after last reading it donkeys' years ago. It was a good reunion.
It extends from mid-1917 (its description of Passchendaele is unforgettable) through to mid-1918, but its main focus is on "Michael", the German assault on the BEF in March 1918. Moore provides about the best account that I have so far read, and above all starkly conveys just what a close call it was.
While not singling out the British generals for condemnation (in places Marshal Foch emerges hardly better, and Petain comes over as frightfully short-sighted) Moore is decidedly not one of the John Terraine school of "rehabilitators". One thing that comes out strongly is that the BEF owed its survival in that crucial month far more to German mistakes than to anything in particular that its own commanders did. The British officers who really counted seem to have been the junior ones, who again and again prevented a unit's retreat from turning into rout. This of course had its downside when the Germans "struck it lucky" and the officer was killed, which all too often was followed by the men surrendering. But overall the officers in the trenches counted for far more than those in the Chateaux. Now why am I not surprised?
From time to time I've heard the 1918 offensives dismissed as a "desperate throw" with little chance of success. Don't believe it. Despite his mediocrity, Ludendorff came within an ace of winning, in which event Pershing's "Seventh Cavalry" would almost certainly have been too late to save the Allies from catastrophic defeat. And like I say, Moore paints a great picture of it. If you're interested in World War One, this is a "must read". (Amazon review)
